Stale Information, Shocks and Volatility by Gropp, Reint & Kadareja, Arjan
Dis cus si on Paper No. 07-012
Stale Information, Shocks 
and Volatility
Reint Gropp and Arjan Kadareja
Dis cus si on Paper No. 07-012
Stale Information, Shocks 
and Volatility
Reint Gropp and Arjan Kadareja
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp07012.pdf
Non-Technical Summary 
Stock volatility can be the result of the arrival of public information, the presence of 
differences private information (or beliefs) among traders and the presence of 
irrational noise traders (mis-pricing). In this paper we use a new approach to 
estimate the effect of differences in private information on volatility. We examine 
the question in the context of high frequency stock returns for a set of large 
European banks. We use a well identified, unexpected shock (monetary policy 
surprises) and estimate the change in banks’ stock return volatility. To measure 
volatility, we use “realised volatility”, as recently proposed by Andersen et al. 
(2003). We relate the change in volatility to a proxy for the accuracy or “freshness” 
of public information available about banks, the annual report. Our hypothesis is that 
if the public information available is stale, we should observe a larger spike in 
volatility, if volatility is driven by traders with different private information or 
beliefs. We argue that higher quality, timelier public information results in a closer 
alignment of information sets of traders, leaving less room for private information or 
beliefs to drive volatility. We also hypothesise and test an inverse relation between 
the persistence of volatility and the quality of the publicly available information. 
The paper can be viewed as a test of the theories on the effect of difference of 
opinions or differences in the interpretation of public information among traders on 
volatility. In our paper, we use the quality of the public information that traders 
receive as a proxy for the extent to which they will differ in their interpretation of 
this information. If the public signal is more precise this leaves less room for 
differences in interpretation and therefore the spike in volatility subsequent to a 
shock should be smaller and less persistent. In the paper, we use the vintage of the 
release of the annual report as a measure of the precision of the information 
available about banks and, hence, the degree to which traders may disagree as to the 
extent of the implications of the monetary policy shock. Specifically, we estimate 
the change in volatility due to the shock as a function of the number of months, 
since the bank published its last annual report. Hence, we examine whether the 
effect on volatility is smaller if the bank just published its annual report last month 
compared to the volatility response if the bank published its last annual report, say, 8 
months ago. The argument is quite simple: The more recent the publication of the 
annual report, the smaller the disagreement of traders as to the implications of the 
shock for the future profitability of the bank. Equivalently, the more recent the 
publication of the annual report, the more aligned the information sets of traders and 
the less important private information. Of course, these arguments only apply, if 
annual reports of banks in fact convey any useful information to markets. In this 
sense, our approach is a joint test of the presence of private information and the 
value of bank annual reports to markets. 
 
 
The paper is directly related to the question of the opacity of banks’ assets (Morgan, 
2002; Flannery et al., 2004) and whether publishing annual reports generally and 
whether improving the frequency and quality of these reports specifically, reduces 
this opacity and is valuable to the market. In this paper we relate opacity to the 
importance of private information in the market. If banks are indeed opaque, the 
volatility of banks’ stocks can be expected to increase significantly upon the arrival 
of surprising and relevant news and evidence that this volatility spike is lower for 
banks for which fresher public information is available would suggest that the 
vintage and the quality of accounting information matters and reduces the degree of 
opacity. Our results suggest that (i) un-anticipated monetary policy shocks result in a 
significant short term increase in bank stock volatility; anticipated monetary policy 
shocks do not; (ii) the increase in volatility is significantly higher in the case of 
banks, for which publicly available information is stale; (iii) this difference is 
economically quite large; and (iv) the increase in volatility is significantly more 
persistent in the case of banks, for which the publicly available information is stale, 
although this effect is economically small. 
The results have a bearing for the recent debate surrounding the idea to increase 
transparency of banks, reflected in Pillar III of the New Basel Accord. The New 
Accord will ask banks to significantly increase the information that they should 
report to markets. The results presented in this paper suggest that the 
implementation of these transparency requirements is important. The results of the 
paper would call for a relatively high frequency of information releases of banks, as 
the information tends to depreciate quickly in value. In the context of indirect 
market discipline of banks, namely the idea that supervisors use market prices 
(especially stock prices) to identify weak banks, this may aide supervisors (and 
potentially also market participants) to better identify such signals. 
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Abstract 
We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private 
information or beliefs on volatility. Using high-frequency intraday data, we estimate 
the volatility effect of a well identified shock on the volatility of the stock returns of 
large European banks as a function of the quality of available public information 
about the banks. We hypothesise that, as the publicly available information becomes 
stale, volatility effects and its persistence should increase, as the private information 
(beliefs) of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea 
in the data. We argue that the results have implications for debate surrounding the 
opacity of banks and the transparency requirements that may be imposed on banks 
under Pillar III of the New Basel Accord. 
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Stale-- aged, not fresh, impaired in vigour or effectiveness 
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Edition 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Stock volatility can be the result of the arrival of public information, the presence of 
differences private information (or beliefs) among traders and the presence of 
irrational noise traders (mis-pricing). In this paper we use a new approach to 
estimate the effect of differences in private information on volatility. We examine 
the question in the context of high frequency stock returns for a set of large 
European banks. We use a well identified, unexpected shock (monetary policy 
surprises) and estimate the change in banks’ stock return volatility. To measure 
volatility, we use “realised volatility”, as recently proposed by Andersen et al. 
(2003). We relate the change in volatility to a proxy for the accuracy or “freshness” 
of public information available about banks, the annual report. Our hypothesis is that 
if the public information available is stale, we should observe a larger spike in 
volatility, if volatility is driven by traders with different private information or 
beliefs. We argue that higher quality, timelier public information results in a closer 
alignment of information sets of traders, leaving less room for private information or 
beliefs to drive volatility. We also hypothesise and test an inverse relation between 
the persistence of volatility and the quality of the publicly available information. 
The paper can be viewed as a test of the theories proposed by Harris and Raviv 
(1993) and Shalen (1993). Harris and Raviv (1993) develop a model of trading in a 
speculative market based on the difference of opinion among traders. In the model 
traders share common prior beliefs and receive common information, but differ in 
the way in which they interpret this information. In our paper, we use the quality of 
the public information that traders receive as a proxy for the extent to which they 
will differ in their interpretation of this information. If the public signal is more 
precise this leaves less room for differences in interpretation and therefore the spike 
in volatility subsequent to a shock should be smaller and less persistent. Similarly, 
Shalen (1993) examines a noise rational expectations model and shows that the 
dispersion of beliefs (i.e. the degree to which traders disagree about the future) 
explains the volatility of returns. The higher this dispersion the higher volatility, 
which has a direct correspondence in our paper: the weaker the publicly available 
information, the greater the dispersion of trader’s beliefs and the higher volatility. 
Our work is closely related to the literature on the importance of informed traders to 
explain (excess) volatility in financial markets. French and Roll (1986), Barclay et 
al. (1990), Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Ito and Lin (1992), and Ito et al. (1998) 
compare volatility at the time when markets are open to volatility when they are 
closed to distinguish the role of private versus public information in explaining 
volatility. The seminal paper in this literature, French and Roll (1986) compare 
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volatility when stock market are closed to when they are open, keeping the flow of 
public information constant. They find that return volatility decreases during these 
closures. They argue that since public information cannot be the reason and mis-
pricing seems to be small, private information is the main source of high trading-
time volatility at times when the exchanges are open. Along similar lines, Barclay et 
al. (1990) examine stock return volatility for the Tokyo Stock Exchange, exploiting 
the phase out of half-day trading on Saturdays. They show that weekend volatility 
fell after the phase-out.3  
Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Ito and Lin (1992) and Ito et al. (1998) concentrate 
on the effect of lunch breaks on volatility. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) show that 
volatility during the lunch break is significantly lower than in the morning or the 
afternoon (U shape). Ito and Lin (1992) compare the lunch time volatility of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, which does break for lunch, with the one of the NYSE, 
which does not. They find that the dip in volatility at the NYSE is much smaller than 
in Tokyo and attribute that to the absence in Tokyo of trading based on private 
information. Ito et al. (1998) examine the effect of phasing out the lunch breaks at 
the Tokyo foreign exchange market. They find that volatility doubles with the 
introduction of trading over lunch and argue that this cannot be due to changes in the 
arrival of public information, as there was no change in public information flows 
associated with the change in opening hours of the exchange. 
The paper is also related to the previous literature on the effect of macro 
announcements on asset levels and volatility (see e.g. Hautsch and Hess, 2002 (US 
T-Bond futures); Fleming and Remolona, 1999 (US Treasury market), Goodhart et 
al., 1993 (exchange rates); Almeida et al., 1998 (exchange rates); Ederington and 
Lee, 1993, 1995 (interest rates and exchange rates, forward rates)). Even though 
Hautsch and Hess (2002) examine the US Treasury bond futures market, their ideas 
are most similar to ours. They examine the effect of the release of the US 
employment report simultaneously on the mean and the variance of Treasury bond 
futures using an intraday ARCH model. The find that non-anticipated information 
leads to a sharp price reaction and even controlling for this, they find a strong and 
persistent increase in volatility. They interpret this finding as providing evidence for 
“considerable disagreement among traders about the precise implications of 
macroeconomic news, which are only slowly resolved.” Hence, Hautsch and Hess 
(2002) share with this paper their concern for volatility arising from differences in 
views among traders (or differences in private information among traders) and the 
impact of the un-anticipated information itself. In Fleming and Remolona (1999), 
the authors also raise the issue of differences in private views driving volatility. 
They examine the effect of the arrival of public information on the level and 
                                           
3  It is possible that their result is driven by a decline in the arrival of public information, as 
Saturday announcements of public information and other market activities were also phased 
out. 
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volatility of prices in the U.S. Treasury Bill market. They find that the release of a 
major macroeconomic announcement induces a sharp and nearly instantaneous price 
change with a persistent effect on volatility. They argue that the persistence in the 
volatility stems from “residual disagreements among investors about what precisely 
the just-released information means for prices”. However, they do not attempt to 
formally relate these differences in private views to differences in the underlying 
information sets. 
We are not aware of any evidence on the effect of monetary policy on high 
frequency stock data.4 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), Thorbecke (1997), Bomfim 
(2003) and Lobo (2000) examine the effect of monetary policy on daily stock 
returns. Bomfim (2003), for example, similarly to our paper examines the effect of 
monetary policy surprises on stock price volatility. He finds, as we do, that monetary 
policy surprises increase volatility significantly in the short run; however, as in 
Fleming and Remolona (1999) he does not link the extent to which volatility 
increases to the information set of traders. As far as we are aware there is no 
evidence of the effect of monetary policy on bank stock prices, even though one 
could argue that banks’ stocks should be a particularly interesting area for studying 
the effect of monetary policy. 
Even so, our primary interest is not in the monetary policy shock per se. We chose 
un-anticipated monetary policy decisions, because their size and timing are easily 
identifiable. Similarly, bank stock prices are particularly interesting when examining 
the effect of differences in information sets of traders, as banks are generally 
considered to be particularly opaque (see e.g. Morgan, 2002) and analysing the value 
of publicly released information to market participants may be particularly 
interesting.5
In the paper, we use the vintage of the release of the annual report as a measure of 
the precision of the information available about banks and, hence, the degree to 
which traders may disagree as to the extent of the implications of the monetary 
policy shock. Specifically, we estimate the change in volatility due to the shock as a 
function of the number of months, since the bank published its last annual report. 
Hence, we examine whether the effect on volatility is smaller if the bank just 
published its annual report last month compared to the volatility response if the bank 
published its last annual report, say, 8 months ago. The argument is quite simple: 
The more recent the publication of the annual report, the smaller the disagreement of 
                                           
4  Also related to is a paper by Andersen et al. (2005), who examine the effect of many different 
macroeconomic announcements on futures contracts. Among many other assets, they also 
consider the effect of US monetary policy decisions on futures contracts of the FTSE100 and 
the S&P 500. Their paper, however, focuses on conditional mean jumps, rather than volatility. 
5  For the opposing views that banks may not be particularly opaque (but rather “boring”) see 
Flannery et al. (2004). 
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traders as to the implications of the shock for the future profitability of the bank. 
Equivalently, the more recent the publication of the annual report, the more aligned 
the information sets of traders and the less important private information. Of course, 
these arguments only apply, if annual reports of banks in fact convey any useful 
information to markets. In this sense, our approach is a joint test of the presence of 
private information and the value of bank annual reports to markets. 
The paper is directly related to the question of the opacity of banks’ assets (Morgan, 
2002; Flannery et al., 2004) and whether publishing annual reports generally and 
whether improving the frequency and quality of these reports specifically, reduces 
this opacity and is valuable to the market. The only evidence we are aware of on this 
issue with regards to banks is provided in Baumann and Nier (2004). Baumann and 
Nier estimate a measure of annual volatility of banks’ stocks as a function of a 
disclosure index based on the information available in Bankscope and some 
controls. Their results suggest that banks disclosing more items in Bankscope tend 
to show lower annual volatility. In this paper we relate opacity to the importance of 
private information in the market. If banks are indeed opaque, the volatility of 
banks’ stocks can be expected to increase significantly upon the arrival of surprising 
and relevant news and evidence that this volatility spike is lower for banks for which 
fresher public information is available would suggest that the vintage and the quality 
of accounting information matters and reduces the degree of opacity. 
Our results suggest that (i) un-anticipated monetary policy shocks result in a 
significant short term increase in bank stock volatility; anticipated monetary policy 
shocks do not; (ii) the increase in volatility is significantly higher in the case of 
banks, for which publicly available information is stale; (iii) this difference is 
economically quite large; and (iv) the increase in volatility is significantly more 
persistent in the case of banks, for which the publicly available information is stale, 
although this effect is economically small. 
The paper is organised as follows: In the following section we describe the 
methodology employed in the paper to measure volatility. Section 3 presents the 
data and section 4 the empirical model. In section 5 we report the results, section 6 
examines robustness and section 7 concludes. 
2 Methodology: realised volatility 
Until recently, common ways to model conditional second moments have been 
based either on the GARCH parameterization proposed by Engle (1982) and 
Bollerslev (1986) or the stochastic volatility methodology (see, for example, Hull 
and White, 1987, and Ghysels et al., 1996, for a survey). In this paper, instead, we 
use the realised volatility approach of Andersen et al. (2003). This methodology has 
the advantage of being model-independent and simple. In addition, it offers the 
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possibility of applying standard econometric techniques to the resulting time series 
of volatility. 
The realised volatility is an ex post measure and is designed for high-frequency data. 
It is computed by cumulating squared compounded returns across a certain time 
window. The returns, in turn, are computed over tiny intervals of that time window 
as log differences of equity prices. As the interval becomes infinitely small, the 
realised volatility converges in probability to the quadratic variation process of the 
returns. Hence, the quadratic variation describes unexpected jumps of second 
moments of returns. Under suitable conditions, the quadratic variation it is shown to 
be an unbiased and highly efficient estimator for the conditional covariance matrix 
of returns. 
Let  be the h,ht+r 1×n  vector of compounded returns over the h window. Its 
conditional distribution can be demonstrated to read as follows (see Andersen et al. 
(2003)): 
{ } [ ]h,sststh,ht , 0∈+++ σ Σμr ~ .    (1) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ∫∫ ++ h sth st ds,dsN 00 Ωμ
{ } [ ]h,s, 0∈⋅⋅σ  is the -field generated by σ ( ) [ ]h,sstst , 0∈++ Σμ , where  is the conditional 
mean vector of returns and  is the associated covariance matrix. 
st+μ
st+Σ
In a discrete time, univariate context, the empirical counterpart to the h-time window 
quadratic return variation is given by the realised volatility, , which is computed 
as follows: 
h,tRV
∑
Δ=
ΔΔ+−=
h,,j
,jhth,t rRV
…1
2 ,         (2) 
where  is the compounded return over the ΔΔ+− ,jhtr Δ  interval and h is the time 
window. 
We turn now to the choice of the Δ  interval. In line with the recent microstructure 
literature (see, for instance, Andersen et al., 2000b, and Bandi and Russell, 2005), 
this choice is subject to a trade-off. On the one hand, the smaller is the interval, the 
lower is the sampling variation of the realised volatility. On the other hand, the 
smaller is the interval, the larger is the contamination due to the microstructure 
noise. Bandi and Russell (2005) determine the optimal Δ  interval minimising the 
mean-squared error of the contaminated variance estimator. Using IBM equity tick 
prices, they find that the optimal interval is approximately two minutes. We choose 
the same interval, since the frequency of our data is similar to that of IBM. 
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3 Data 
3.1. Unanticipated monetary policy decisions 
We use unanticipated monetary policy decisions in the euro area and the UK as our 
shock variable. We chose this particular macroeconomic shock because we have 
precise information on its exact timing (to the minute) and magnitude, which is 
crucial in the context of examining tick data, and it is straightforward to differentiate 
between an anticipated and an un-anticipated component of the shock. Our sample 
period, which is determined by the availability of tick data (see below), is from 
January 1999 until May 2004.  
ECB monetary policy decisions during January 1999 to December 2001 were taken 
on every second Thursday. After December 2001, the ECB moved to taking 
decisions only on the first Thursday of each month. As for the Bank of England 
(BoE), monetary policy decisions are taken once a month, usually on Thursdays, but 
there are also decisions taken on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. The sample includes 
101 and 66 ECB and BoE decision days, respectively. In order to differentiate 
between anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy decisions, we follow 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003) and use expectation data based on a Reuters poll of 
25-30 market participants. The polls are conducted on the Friday before the 
meetings of the ECB Governing Council and the BoE Monetary Policy Committee. 
We use the mean of this survey as our expectation variable. Surprises are defined as 
the difference between the actual change in the ECB’s and BoE’s policy rates minus 
the mean of the Reuters poll. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003) show that these 
expectations are unbiased and efficient. 
Descriptive statistics on the monetary policy decisions are given in Table 1. As 
reported in Panel A, out of 101 ECB monetary policy decisions, 86 were to leave 
rates unchanged and on 15 days rates were either increased or decreased. Decreases 
and increases are about in balance, with seven changes up and eight changes down. 
In general, changes up were somewhat smaller on average (0.32%) compared to 
changes down (-0.44%). This is explained by the fact that the majority of increases 
were by 25 basis points and the majority of decreases was by 50 basis points. In 
total, there were 56 surprises: 35 represent surprises with monetary policy being 
tighter than expected and 21 represent surprises with looser than expected monetary 
policy. While market participants were more often wrong in the direction of 
looseness, their error was larger when they expected a tighter monetary policy. 
Given our definition of the monetary policy surprises, there is a surprise component 
on all days when rates were changed, although in many cases it is small. The 
statistics also suggest that there were 41 days when at least some market participants 
expected a change and the ECB decided to leave rates unchanged. 
6 
Panel B reports similar statistics for the Bank of England’s monetary policy 
decisions. The Bank of England left rates unchanged 50 times out of 66 MPC 
meetings. A comparison between Panels A and B shows that the number of surprises 
relative to the BoE decisions is almost the same as that of ECB’s, despite the higher 
number of ECB decision days. All decisions by the Bank of England to move rates 
were by 25 basis points. On the other hand, the magnitude of average surprises 
associated with the ECB decisions is larger than those of the Bank of England.6
3.2. Bank tick equity prices 
In order to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks on volatility, we use tick 
equity transaction prices from three stock exchanges, the Deutsche Börse, Euronext 
(Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris), and the London Stock Exchange.7 The adoption of 
high frequency data is essential for two reasons. First, it permits to calculate 
volatility series across intraday windows. These windows, in turn, can be chosen so 
that one of them will commence exactly when the monetary policy decision is 
announced. This would allow us to very precisely measure the effect on volatility 
due to monetary policy shocks. Second, the effects of monetary policy shocks 
should be largely uncontaminated by other pieces of news. 
We constructed our sample of banks using sets of tick data covering the same period 
as our data on monetary policy shocks. In the case of Deutsche Börse and London 
Stock Exchange (“German sub-sample” and “UK sub-sample”, respectively) we 
have data from 1 January 1999 to 31 May 2004; however for Euronext data are only 
available for 1 January 2002 to 31 May 2004 (“Euronext sub-sample”). The 
Euronext subsample is shorter because Euronext started making tick data available 
only in 2002. Within the three markets we limit ourselves to banks that are 
continuously traded throughout the sample period, which yields an initial number of 
six banks in the case of Euronext, six in the case of Deutsche Börse and five in the 
case of London Stock Exchange. 
 
                                           
6  While there were a number of decisions taking place in the same week, which should not 
influence our results given our approach, same day decisions would be more problematic. There 
were two days with decisions of the Bank of England and the ECB on the same day during our 
sample period. The results reported below are robust to dropping those two days from the 
estimation. 
7  The two continental European stock exchanges for equity trading are order driven. The order 
types that may be submitted to the Central Order Book consist of market orders, limit orders, 
market-to-limit orders, stop orders and orders subject to special conditions. The London Stock 
Exchange also has market makers. 
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From a close examination of the bank trading frequency two distinct groups emerge. 
The first group includes Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and Hypovereinsbank, for 
the German sub-sample, ING, ABN Amro, BNP Paribas and Société Générale, for 
the Euronext sub-sample, and HSBC, Abbey National Bank, Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Barclays, in the case of the London Stock Exchange. The second group 
contains IKB Deutsche Industriebank, DePfa, Bankgesellschaft Berlin, KBC, 
Natexis Banques Populaires and Standard Chartered. The equities of the banks 
belonging to the first group (German and UK) were traded on average about 1000 
times per day, whereas the shares of the other group were traded on average between 
100 and 400 times per day.  
A preliminary analysis shows that, for the first group, the average volatility levels 
are quite similar across banks. Furthermore, volatilities exhibit the well-known U-
shape across daily windows. Instead, volatility levels differ quite substantially 
within the second group and vis-à-vis the first group. In addition, volatilities behave 
quite erratically across daily windows. Therefore, we choose not to include the 
banks of the second group in our analysis, yielding a sample of eleven banks: Abbey 
National, ABN Amro, Barclays, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, 
Hypovereinsbank, ING, BNP Paribas, Royal Bank of Scotland and Societe 
Generale. It turns out that these eleven banks represent, with one exception,8 the 
largest publicly traded banks in Europe in terms of total assets. 
 We limit our sample to the day of the monetary policy decision of the ECB and the 
Bank of England, respectively, (usually a Thursday) and the days immediately 
before and after. Using only the two days immediately adjacent to the day of the 
monetary policy decision allows us to focus on the volatility effects of the surprises 
and, at the same time, to maintain a manageable sample size. For the Deutsche Börse 
sample this yields a sample size of 298 days for each of the three banks, for the 
shorter Euronext sample we obtain 86 days for each of the four banks.9
The computation of equity returns is problematic because observations are unequally 
spaced. In line with Andersen et al. (2003), we calculate two minute interval equity 
prices by linear interpolation of the two tick log prices immediately before and after 
the two minute time stamps. Slow trading activity before nine o’clock a.m. and after 
five o’clock p.m. justifies a choice of the trading day between 09:00:00 and 
17:00:00. However, for the euro area sub-sample the trading day starts at 09:09:00 
                                           
8  Dresdner Bank is the only bank among the largest in Europe not part of our sample, as it was 
acquired by Allianz in early 1999. 
9  During 1999 to 2004 there were 101 monetary policy decision days of the ECB (Table 1). As 
we use the day before and after the decision day, we generally have three days multiplied by 
101 decision days, i.e. 303 days. However, there were 5 holidays in the sample for which no 
data are available. The sample for the Euronext banks was constructed equivalently, taking the 
shorter time period from 2002 to 2004 into account. 
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and ends at 16:49:00 CET for the following reason. We divide the day into ten 
equally spaced windows (each composed of 46 minutes), with the seventh one 
commencing exactly at 13:45:00, when the ECB monetary policy decision is 
announced. This yields a sample size of 298 days for three banks with nine intervals 
per day (we lose one interval as we use lagged realised volatilities as one of our 
dependent variables), in total 8046 observations for the Deutsche Börse sample. For 
the Euronext banks we equivalently obtain 86 days for four banks with nine 
intervals per day, i.e. 3096 observations. 
As for the UK sub-sample, we also divide the trading day into ten equally spaced 
windows, 46 minutes each. The trading day starts at 08:56:00 and ends at 16:36:00 
local time, with the fifth window beginning exactly at 12:00:00, when the Bank of 
England announces its monetary policy. The time difference between the two central 
banks’ policy announcements, when they are made over the same day, is 45 minutes. 
With daily windows of 46 minutes there will be no overlapping between the 
windows immediately following the policy announcements. This yields a sample 
size of 198 days for four banks and nine intervals per day, i.e. 7128 observations. 
However, in case of the UK sample we had missing or incomplete data for some 
periods and also excluded some unreasonable small or large values for realised 
volatility (in excess of five standard deviations). These very high or low values were 
clustered within a few days and we excluded the entire day, if there was at least one 
outlier in a given day. In total the resulting sample contained 6678 observations on 
realised volatility for the four UK banks.10 In total, therefore, the regressions below 
rely on 17820 observations for all banks combined. 
Descriptive statistics for equity 46 minutes window returns, standardised equity 
returns11, realised volatilities and log of realised volatilities are given in Appendix I. 
As shown by the Ljung-Box test ( )10Q  with ten lags, realised and standardised 
returns exhibit no or low autocorrelation, while realised volatility and its log do. 
Return series on all banks and the related realised volatilities are not normal. 
Kurtosis is larger than three, indicating that the probability mass is concentrated 
more in the centre and tails relative to the normal. Data also show severely right 
skewed realised volatilities for all banks, whereas returns seem to be more 
symmetric, with the exception of Commerzbank. This is confirmed by the Jarque-
Bera test for normality, and the theoretical quantile–quantile pictures (see Figure 1). 
The standardised returns and the log of realised volatilities are close to normal, as 
seen from kurtosis, skewness, the Jarque-Bera statistics, and the theoretical 
                                           
10  Excluded observations were for HSBC the days 05/04/2001, 06/04/2001, 
10/05/2001,03/10/2001 and 10/01/2002; for Abbey National 06/06/2000 and 02/08/2000 (no 
data); for Royal Bank of Scotland 07/12/2000 and 08/05/2002; for Barclays 02/08/2000. 
Finally, the data set did not contain data for HSBC for the period 01/01/1999-31/06/1999. 
11  Standardised equity returns are computed as the ratio of returns and their realised volatility. 
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quantile–quantile pictures (see Appendix I and Figure 1). Therefore, the distribution 
of standardised 46 minutes window returns and the relative log of realised 
volatilities can be assumed to be normal with ~21 /itit RVr − ( )10,N  and ~( )itRVln ( )2σμ,N , 
where  and  are the return on asset i and the associated realised volatility, 
respectively. The assumption of normality allows us to use standard econometric 
methods when modelling the log of realised volatilities. 
itr itRV
For all banks we plot the log of realised volatilities versus daily windows (see 
figures 2a-2k). The values associated with each window are equal to log volatility 
averages across days. Each picture contains two curves of volatility averages 
corresponding to days of no monetary policy decisions, and days when monetary 
policy comes as a surprise, respectively. All the graphs show that volatilities are U-
shaped, i.e. the volatility is higher at the beginning and the end of the trading day. 
This pattern is well documented in the literature (see, for instance, Engle, 2000). The 
level of volatility is similar across banks. The timing of a monetary policy shock is 
depicted by a vertical line in the chart and we can see a noticeable spike in volatility 
if monetary policy was un-anticipated, which only slowly dissipates. In the 
remainder of the paper we will attempt to explain the magnitude of the change in 
volatility in response to the unanticipated monetary policy shock as a function of the 
quality of public information available about the bank, hoping to uncover 
differences in volatility due to unobservable differences in private information or 
beliefs.  
4 The econometric specification 
The objective of our model is to measure the effects of monetary policy surprises on 
volatility, taking into account information that investors possess at the time of the 
shock.  We estimate the following basic model: 
,
____
__int_
21321
6
1
5
1
9
2
1110
perdnompsmpsfridthurdmontued
bankdyearddLNRVLNRV
tttttt
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i
tii
i
tii
i
titt
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λγβαα
+++++
+++++= ∑∑∑
===
−−        (3) 
where: 
i)  is the log of realised volatility for the window t. We introduce an 
autoregressive term to capture the high persistence of the volatility as evidenced by 
the Ljung-Box test (see Table 2).
tLNRV
12
                                           
12  The construction of LNRVt-1 is done in such a way so that the observations corresponding to the 
first window are excluded. This is done because our sample is not continuous across days. 
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ii) . 
⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise
windowdailyithtocorresponddatatheif
d it 0
  1
int_
We introduce the time window dummies  to accommodate the U-shape intra-
daily volatility of asset returns. The fourth window is the omitted category. 
itd int_
[ ].2003,2002,2001,2000,1999 ,
0
1
_ iii) ∈
⎩⎨
⎧= iiit yearotherwise
yeartocorresponddatatheif
yeard These 
time dummies take account of the possible changes in market volatility, for example 
related to the internet boom ending in 2001. 2004 is the omitted category. 
iv) , 
⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise
banktocorresponddatatheif
bank_d iit 0
1
[ bar,rbs,abbn,hsbc,sg,bnp,ing,abn,hb,cbbanki ∈ ]
)
.13 The bank dummies allow us to 
capture the differences in the level of realised volatility across banks. Deutsche Bank 
is the omitted category.14
v)  
⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise
TuesdayorMondayaisdaytradingtheif
montuedt 0
1
_
vi) . 
⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise
Thursdayisdaytradingtheif
thurdt 0
1
_
vii) . 
⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise
Fridayisdaytradingtheif
fridt 0
1
_
Monday, Tuesday (which we combined as we had relatively few observations), 
Thursday and, above all, Friday effects are captured by the daily 
dummies ,  and . Wednesday is the omitted category. montuedt _ thurdt _ fridt _
viii) , where ( ttt meanreutersiabsmps −Δ= tiΔ  is different from zero only over the fourth 
and sixth daily windows, corresponding to a BoE and ECB interest rate change, 
respectively, and  is the average of the interest rate change expectations. tmeanreuters
                                           
13  We use the following abbreviations for the individual banks: cb stands for Commerzbank, hb 
for Hypovereinsbank, abn for ABN AMRO, ing for ING, bnp for BNP Paribas, sg for Société 
Générale, hsbc for HSBC Bank, abbn for Abbey National Bank, rbs for Royal Bank of Scotland 
and bar for Barclays. 
14  This approach is equivalent to running a fixed effects (for banks) panel regression. Results from 
a panel model are available from the authors upon request. 
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Expectations on monetary policy decisions are computed by Reuters with a poll of 
market participants. 
ix)  .
otherwise
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The dummy measures the effect of an anticipated monetary policy shock on 
volatility. 
ix) , where 1,75;97 __ −−− ⋅= ttt LNRVmpsdperd
.
0
  76,5 & 0
  98,7 & 0
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t
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This variable captures the volatility persistence over the three windows immediately 
after a monetary policy shock.  
We want estimate the effect of unobservable differences in private information or 
beliefs on volatility. In order to do this we evaluate the volatility effect of an un-
anticipated monetary policy shock in relation to the quality of public information 
available about the bank ex ante. Our measure of the quality of public information is 
the vintage of the last annual report released by the bank.15 The vintage is given by 
the number of months since the bank published its last report.16 We hypothesise that, 
as the report gets older, the information contained depreciates in value to traders. We 
argue that volatility is generated by a combination of the news effect of the 
monetary policy decision itself (public information) and by differences in the 
interpretation of the effect of this news on the banks (Harris and Raviv, 2003; 
Shalen, 2003). As the quality of the prior information about the bank increases (is 
more up to date and less stale), we would expect a smaller effect of the monetary 
policy shock on bank stock return volatility. This approach to testing for the 
presence of private information in the market has two important advantages. One, it 
does not suffer from reverse causality. Reverse causality could arise if banks react to 
                                           
15  We examine the effect of interim reports published by the bank below. 
16  We obtained the annual report release dates (and the dates of the release of interim reports, see 
below) from Reuters News service. 
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high volatility of their own stock price by releasing more information to the market 
(see e.g. Baumann and Nier, 2004). Second, by focusing on differences in volatility 
response to shocks within the same bank, we would argue that our results do not 
suffer from omitted variable bias, i.e. that the differences in volatility are driven not 
by differences in information but by differences in some omitted variable that is 
correlated with information. This problem frequently arises when the identification 
of the model largely relies on cross-sectional differences among banks. In our 
approach, we test whether the response in volatility of, say, Deutsche Bank is higher 
if the last annual report of Deutsche Bank was released 10 months ago compared to 
the response in volatility of Deutsche bank if the last annual report was released just 
2 months ago. 
Table 2 illustrates this point. It shows the number of months before a given 
monetary policy surprise (of the ECB or the Bank of England, respectively) the 
annual report of the bank was released. It shows that the sample is essentially 
uniformly distributed across the different time leads between publication and the 
monetary policy surprises in the sample. This is true both for the sample as a whole, 
as well as for each individual bank. Overall, this re-enforces our point that this time 
difference is indeed uncorrelated with the identity of the bank. 
Therefore, we estimate a second specification which differs from the basic model in 
equation (2) by interacting monetary policy surprises with the number of months 
since the publication of the last annual report. The variables  and  are 
replaced each by: 
tmps per_dt
∑
=
=
12
1i
i,tt arepmps  and . ∑
=
=
12
1i
i,tt dpper_d
These variables are defined as follows: tt,aii,t mpsdarep = , and per_dddp tt,aii,t = ,  
where  and i=1..12. 
⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise
agomonthsireleasedisreportannualtheif
d t,ai 0
        1
5 Empirical Results 
In the first set of columns of Table 3 we report the estimation results of the basic 
model described by equation (3). Parameters are estimated by a pooled-OLS 
regression with cluster robust standard errors.17 As expected, volatility is highly 
persistent: about 54% of a given shock is transmitted to the next time window. The 
bank dummies indicate the difference in volatility averages vis-à-vis Deutsche Bank. 
Commerzbank, Hypovereinsbank, ING, Abbey National, RBS and Barclays show 
                                           
17  The cluster option allows relaxing the assumption of observation independence within banks. 
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relatively higher volatility. The level of volatility of the other banks does not tend to 
be significantly different from that of Deutsche Bank. Time dummies indicate that 
volatility is more pronounced in the years before 2004, reaching higher levels in 
2002 and 2003. This may be due to down market effects. The coefficients associated 
with the window dummies  broadly confirm the daily U-shape of the realised 
volatility (see figures 2a-2k) with the fourth window, commencing at 11:27 (11:16) 
and ending 46 minutes later for the euro area (UK), respectively. As regards to the 
day of the week dummies, we find no significant difference in volatility between 
Wednesdays (omitted category), Thursdays, Mondays and Tuesdays. However, 
volatility tends to be significantly higher on Fridays, which is consistent with the 
previous literature on intraday volatility in stock markets (see e.g. Andersen et al., 
2000a). 
it w_d
When the monetary policy decision comes as a surprise, volatility significantly 
jumps up. A surprise, say, of 50 basis points generates, on average, an increase in 
volatility approximately equal to one percent.18 On the other hand, volatility does 
not significantly change when the decision is fully anticipated by market participants 
(“nomps”). As seen from figures 2a-2k, the effect on volatility of a monetary policy 
surprise tends to be persistent. After the shock, the volatility measured in the days of 
surprises is, by and large, higher than the volatility computed over the other days. 
The coefficient associated with the three following time windows after the surprise, 
d_per, is significant at the one percent level, although quite small. 
Next, let us consider the effect of the quality of public information on volatility, as 
proxied for by the vintage of the annual reports. Estimation results of the extended 
model are reported in the second set of columns of Table 3. In Figures 3 and 4 we 
plot, respectively, coefficient values corresponding to  –  and  –  
against the information lags. A simple regression line fitted to coefficient values is 
increasing, suggesting that, as information becomes outdated, the effect of surprises 
on volatility becomes higher and more persistent.
1,tarep 12,tarep 1dp 12dp
19 However, a number of the 
estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Therefore, we 
combine the monthly variables into quarterly variables.20 The coefficients for the 
resulting “Restricted Model” are reported in the third set of columns in Table 3. 
                                           
18  As the dependent variable is in logs, the reported coefficients are semi-elasticities. 
19  A second order polynomial fitted to the same data points is also monotonically increasing. 
20  We alternatively also used an F-test to aggregate variables. We first test the null hypothesis that 
the first two  coefficients are equal. If the null is not rejected, we test whether the third 
coefficient is equal to the first two. We continue until the null is rejected. When this occurs, we 
start again testing the null that the last coefficient is equal to the following one. The procedure 
ends when all coefficients are classified. The results are conditional on the choice of the starting 
null hypothesis. The choice is suggested by the shape of the second order polynomials. The 
results are consistent with the specification using quarterly variables. 
i,tarep
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They suggest that the effect of a monetary policy shock on volatility is about three 
times the size if the report is 10 to 12 months old compared to when the report is 
fresh, i.e. 1 to 3 months old. All coefficients are significant at least at the five 
percent level and the difference between annual reports being 1 to 3 months old to 
annual reports being 10 to 12 months is significant at the one percent level. 
Similarly, we find hardly any persistence in the shock when the annual report is 
fresh, whereas if the report is old, persistence increases by more than 1 percent. 
Again, the difference is significant at the one percent level. Economically, if the 
publicly available information about the banks is current, i.e. no more than 3 months 
old, a 50 basis point monetary policy surprise results in an increase in volatility of 
about 0.6 percent. If the information is stale (i.e. 10 to 12 months old), this increases 
to more than 2 percent.  
However, we also find that the increase in volatility is not monotonic. Both for the 
volatility spike itself and for its persistence we estimate a noticeable dip if the 
annual report is 7 to 9 months old. We hypothesised that this may have to do with 
the publication of interim and, in particular, semi-annual reports. These reports 
could also contribute to aligning trader’s information sets. Since banks typically 
publish a semi-annual report about six months after publishing their annual report, 
the dip in the volatility effect may be due to the information contained in those 
reports. However, many of the banks in the sample also publish quarterly reports 
and they, even though they contain significantly less information compared to 
annual reports, may also be useful to traders.  
As a consequence we performed two additional estimations. One, we estimate 
whether the simple fact that the bank published an interim report (whether quarterly 
or semi-annual) had information value to traders. We do this by interacting the 
“arep” variables with a dummy equal to one, if an interim report was published 
during the period. If interim reports contain important information, we would expect 
to find that even if the annual report was published quite some time ago, the 
volatility effect of a monetary policy surprise remains small if an interim report was 
published recently. The results for this exercise are reported in Table 4 and suggest 
that in general this does not seem to be the case and interim reports provide no 
additional information to traders. 
Second, we started from which information traders would find useful in estimating 
the impact of an unanticipated interest rate shock on banks and what is contained in 
the “most extensive” reports in our sample. We identified eight items: 
1. Information interest rate risk and how the bank deals with it 
2. Breakdown of the loan portfolio into variable rate and fixed rate loans 
3. Breakdown of loan commitments into variable rate and fixed rate 
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4. Data on the use of interest rate derivatives 
5. Detailed value-at-risk information for interest rate risk 
6. Fair value reporting of the loan portfolio 
7. Remaining term to maturity breakdown for loans and deposits 
8. Detailed explanations of interest income and expenses 
We then checked to which extent this type of information is available in annual or 
interim reports and classified reports as informative if at least 6 of the eight items 
were available and uninformative otherwise. It turns out that this approach results in 
the classification of all annual reports as informative. In addition, all interim reports 
are classified as uninformative with the following exceptions:21  
Deutsche Bank: Interim report Q2 1999 
Barclays: all semi-annual reports from 1998-2004 
HSBC: all semi-annual reports from 2001-2004 
Abbey National: Semi-annual report 2003 
BNP Paribas: Interim reports Q2 from 2002-200422
Societe Generale: Interim report Q2 2003 
Based on this information we re-coded the “arep” variables to reflect the latest 
informative report, whether annual or interim and re-estimated the model. The 
results are reported in Table 4 (“Interim report model II”). It appears that traders 
value informative reports, as defined here. The dip in the effect on volatility for 7 to 
9 months information is now much smaller than in previous specifications (a 
coefficient of 3.24 relative to 1.86); however, overall the results suggest that 
information does not depreciate linearly in value to traders. There is a steep increase 
in volatility if informative reports are older than 3 months (the impact of a monetary 
policy surprise doubles) but little additional depreciation as an informative report 
becomes even older. 
Overall, we interpret these results as consistent with the presence of private 
information in markets. As investors have more accurate information about the bank 
(because the annual report is recent and informative), they disagree less about the 
effect of the shock on the earnings potential of the bank. Therefore, the impact 
volatility of the monetary policy surprise is lower and less persistent. This effect is 
economically quite significant. The results also suggest that the information given in 
                                           
21  Appendix III gives more details on interim reports. 
22  BNP Paribas publishes an “extensive” interim report for the second quarter of each year and a 
short version for Q1 and Q3. 
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annual reports (and some interim reports) by banks is valuable to market participants 
and conveys useful information about banks, at least in the context of aiding markets 
to interpret the impact of unanticipated monetary policy on banks. Annual reports 
appear to reduce the opacity of banks. Finally, we show that the value of information 
contained in banks’ annual reports depreciates relatively quickly over time.  
6 Robustness  
We conduct two exercises to check whether the above result is robust to changes in 
the definition of monetary policy shocks. First, instead of interacting the vintage of 
the annual report with the size of the monetary policy surprise, we interact the 
vintage of the annual report with a dummy variable indicating whether or not there 
was a surprise. Hence, we abstract from the size of the monetary policy shock (Table 
5, robustness I). The results are economically and econometrically extremely similar 
to those reported in Table 3, although the depreciation over time seems to be 
smoother compared to the earlier specifications.  
Second, we examined the euro area and the UK separately, as there may important 
differences in the way monetary policy is conducted and the communication policy 
of the respective central banks. The results are reported in Table 5 and show that the 
impact of monetary policy shocks is larger if the annual report is older in both 
economic areas, even though there is a level effect (no matter the vintage of the 
annual report), since the overall magnitude of the coefficients is higher in the UK 
compared to the euro area.23 The magnitude of the effect of the vintage of the annual 
report is significant in both cases: If the annual report is 10 to 12 months old, the 
effect of monetary policy surprises on stock price volatility is five times (two times) 
compared to the effect when the annual report was just published in the euro area 
(the UK).24
Finally, we also have some banks which are cross-listed in the US New York Stock 
exchange and some banks that are not. Listing at the NYSE implies that banks have 
to fulfil certain additional transparency requirements in line with US GAAP, 
including for example reporting fair values on its loan portfolio in the notes to the 
                                           
23  This suggests that the impact of monetary policy shocks on bank stock volatility is overall 
higher in the UK. One interpretation of this finding would be that market participants find the 
effect of monetary policy surprises on bank profitability more difficult to estimate in case of 
UK banks. This may have a myriad of reasons, including a more complex balance sheet 
structure, greater exposure to more complex assets or other issues. 
24  The dip after six months is also present in both economic areas when estimating the model 
separately, as we did not use the information contained in “informative” interim reports in this 
section. 
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annual report.25 If this additional information is valuable, banks that are cross-listed 
should exhibit a smaller increase in volatility (and less persistence). We find strong 
evidence for this idea: A dummy indicating whether or not the bank was cross-listed 
in the US interacted with the monetary policy surprise was highly significant and 
negative, suggesting that impact of monetary policy surprises for those banks is 
smaller. While we think that these results overall provide further support to our 
ideas, they are a little difficult to interpret, as the dummy on cross-listing is 
endogenous and may reflect other differences in releasing information or business 
policy about the bank. A complete set of these results are available upon request. 
7 Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of monetary policy surprises on 
the volatility of equity returns for the largest European banks, taking into account 
the quality of public information available at the time of the surprise. We use this as 
a new approach to testing for the importance of differences in opinions among 
traders in explaining volatility. We provide evidence that stale public information 
(older annual and interim reports) significantly increase volatility upon an un-
anticipated monetary policy shock. We find a similar information effect on 
persistence of volatility. Finally, our results suggest that accounting information may 
depreciate quite quickly over time, i.e. within three months, suggesting a relatively 
high frequency of information releases by banks. 
The results in this paper are in our view strong evidence in support of Harris and 
Raviv (2003) and Shalen (2003), in the sense that they suggest that if investors 
information set is poorly aligned to due stale publicly available information, the 
impact on volatility of an unanticipated shock (in this case a monetary policy shock) 
is larger than if the publicly available information is fresh. Disagreements among 
traders based on differences in interpretation of the publicly available information 
become more important in case public information is stale. This adds to the body of 
literature showing that private information in markets matters for explaining 
volatility (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Ito and Lin (1992) and Ito et al. 
(1998) Hautsch and Hess, 2002 and Fleming and Remolona, 1999). The 
methodology used in the paper and most importantly the approach used to identify 
the effect of private information differs sharply, however, from the previous 
literature.  
The findings can also be interpreted as providing a new perspective on the question 
of bank opacity (Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al, 2004). While we do not provide 
direct evidence on whether banks are more or less opaque than non-financial firms, 
                                           
25  For a summary of the debate surrounding the introduction of fair value accounting for banks in 
Europe in connection with IAS 39, see Enria et al. (2004) and Michael (2004). 
18 
we show that bank transparency, detail in annual reports and, especially, the 
issuance of frequent reports, reduces opacity and is valuable to investors. This is 
also interesting in light of the recent debate surrounding the idea to increase 
transparency of banks, reflected in Pillar III of the New Basel Accord. The New 
Accord will ask banks to significantly increase the information that they should 
report to markets. The results presented in this paper suggest that the 
implementation of these transparency requirements is important. The results of the 
paper would call for a relatively high frequency of information releases of banks, as 
the information tends to depreciate quickly in value. In the context of indirect 
market discipline of banks, namely the idea that supervisors use market prices 
(especially stock prices) to identify weak banks, this may aide supervisors (and 
potentially also market participants) to better identify such signals (see e.g. Borio et 
al., 2004 for an overview). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of monetary policy decisions 
Total 101 Average rate increase 0.32 Days with surprises 56
without rate changes 86 Average rate decrease -0.44 Days with positive surprises * 35
with rate changes 15 Number of days with 0.25 increase 5 Days with negative surprises ** 21
no. of rate increases 7 Number of days with 0.5 increase 2 Days without surprises 45
no. of rate decreases 8 Number of days with 0.25 decrease 2 Average positive surprise * 0.09
Number of days with 0.5 decrease 6 Average negative surprise ** -0.22
* Tighter than expected monetary policy
** Looser than expected monetary policy
Total 66 Average rate increase 0.25 Days with surprises 51
without rate changes 50 Average rate decrease -0.25 Days with positive surprises * 29
with rate changes 16 Number of days with 0.25 increase 7 Days with negative surprises ** 22
no. of rate increases 7 Number of days with 0.5 increase 0 Days without surprises 15
no. of rate decreases 9 Number of days with 0.25 decrease 9 Average positive surprise * 0.036
Number of days with 0.5 decrease 0 Average negative surprise ** -0.054
* Tighter than expected monetary policy
** Looser than expected monetary policy
Panel B : BoE Monetary policy decisions (January 1999 - May 2004)
Monetary policy decision days Size of monetary policy decisions Unexpected monetary policy decisions
Panel A : ECB Monetary policy decisions (January 1999 - May 2004)
Monetary policy decision days Size of monetary policy decisions Unexpected monetary policy decisions
 
 
Table 2: Monetary policy surprises and annual reports: descriptive statistics 
 
Number of months before a monetary policy surprise that the annual report was released. 
Monetary policy surprises are defined as the difference in the Reuter’s poll and the change 
in the respective policy rate.  
 
              
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 ≥12 Total 
              
              
Euro area              
              
Deutsche Bank 6 6 4 6 3 5 3 6 6 4 3 4 56 
Hypovereinsbank 5 6 4 5 5 7 2 3 8 4 2 5 56 
Commerzbank 5 6 5 6 5 3 5 4 7 3 2 5 56 
ABN Amro 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 14 
ING Bank 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
BNP Paribas 2 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Société Générale 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
              
UK              
              
HSBC 4 3 3 4 4 1 2 4 4 4 4 5 42 
Abbey National 4 5 5 5 4 1 1 5 4 4 5 7 50 
Royal Bank of  
Scotland 
5 5 5 5 3 2 3 5 4 4 5 5 51 
Barclays 6 5 4 6 4 1 1 5 3 4 3 8 50 
              
Total 43 40 33 45 33 24 20 37 40 31 27 44 417 
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Table 3: Estimation results 
Estimated using equation (2) in the text using OLS with robust standard errors (clustering for 
banks). Omitted categories: Deutsche Bank, 2004, interval 4, Wednesdays. The unrestricted and 
the restricted model contain the same non-monetary policy control variables as the basic model. ** 
and * suggest significance at 1%, and 5 % level, respectively. LNRV denotes the natural log of 
realised volatility, HSBC stands for HSBC, ABBN for Abbey National Bank, RBS for Royal Bank 
of Scotland, BAR for Barclays, ABN for ABN Amro, ING for ING Bank, BNP for BNP Paribas, 
SG for Société Générale, DB for Deutsche Bank, HB for Hypovereinsbank, and CB for 
Commerzbank. The dependent variable is the natural log of realised volatility (as described in the 
text) in window t for bank i. 
Basic Model Unrestricted Model Restricted Model 
         
Variable Coef. t-stat. Variable Coef. t-stat. Variable Coef. t-stat. 
         
LNRVt-1 0.54** 14.42 arep1 2.52* 2.67 arep1_3 1.21** 2.57 
d_cb 0.11** 11.94 arep2 0.97* 2.66 arep4_6 3.40*** 4.60 
d_hb 0.10** 12.30 arep3 0.97 1.45 arep7_9 1.86*** 3.17 
d_abn -0.02 -1.13 arep4 3.61** 4.08 arep10-12 4.50*** 4.25 
d_ing 0.05* 2.33 arep5 3.88** 6.09 dp1_3 -0.00 -0.63 
d_bnp -0.00 -0.02 arep6 0.83 0.47 dp4_6 0.017*** 3.65 
d_sg 0.03 1.48 arep7 2.19 1.98 dp7_9 0.005 1.39 
d_hsbc -0.01 -2.03 arep8 1.17 1.75 dp10_12 0.012*** 3.54 
d_abbn 0.16** 13.00 arep9 3.10* 2.84    
d_rbs 0.14** 16.35 arep10 6.10** 5.47    
d_bar 0.12** 15.04 arep11 4.64 1.62    
d_1999 0.16** 4.19 arep12 3.85* 2.21    
d_2000 0.19** 5.14 dp1 -0.00 -0.11    
d_2001 0.19** 6.16 dp2 -0.00 -0.69    
d_2002 0.26** 14.44 dp3 -0.01 -0.81    
d_2003 0.20** 21.06 dp4 0.02** 3.41    
d_int1 0.02 1.50 dp5 0.02** 4.11    
d_int2 0.04** 5.66 dp6 0.00 0.20    
d_int3 0.02* 3.00 dp7 0.02* 2.41  
d_int5 0.03** 3.19 dp8 -0.01 -1.31    
d_int6 0.09** 5.13 dp9 0.01 1.90    
d_int7 0.16** 17.53 dp10 0.01 0.89    
d_int8 0.20** 8.91 dp11 0.01 0.97  
d_int9 0.37** 4.38 dp12 0.02** 5.41    
d_montue 0.02 1.27       
d_thur 0.01 1.51       
d_fri 0.03** 5.25       
nomps 0.07 2.20       
mps 2.05** 4.23       
d_per 0.01** 3.51       
constant -2.71** -12.01       
N 17820 17820 
R2 0.41 0.43 
17820 
0.43 
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Table 4: Information content of interim reports 
Estimated with OLS using robust standard errors. In interim model I arep4_6int is equal to the size 
of the monetary policy surprise if the annual report was published 4 to 6 months ago and an 
interim report was published during the period. Equivalently arep4_6nint is equal to the size of the 
monetary policy shock if the annual report was published 4 to 6 months ago and no interim report 
was published during the period. In interim model II all “arep” variables were recoded measuring 
the number of months since an informative report (whether annual or interim) was published. 
“Informative” defined in the text. Both models include all variables of the previous specification. 
Only coefficients of interest reported for brevity. 
 Interim Report Model I  Interim Report model II 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat 
      
arep1_3 1.19** 2.55 arep1_3 1.64 1.87 
arep4_6int 3.54*** 15.94 arep4_6 4.51** 2.81 
arep4_6nint 3.07 1.47 arep7_9 3.24** 2.92 
arep7_9int 1.85* 2.12 arep10_12 4.96*** 5.09 
arep7_9nint 1.40*** 7.91    
arep10_12int 4.98*** 5.22    
arep10_12nint 4.65*** 2.76    
N 17820  17820 
R2 0.43  0.44 
 
Table 5: Robustness checks 
Estimated using OLS using robust standard errors. Robustness I reflects a model in which the 
monetary policy surprises are measured with a dummy variable, i.e. the size of the surprise does 
not enter. All models include all variables of the previous specifications. Only coefficients of 
interest reported for brevity. 
 Robustness I  Euro area banks 
only 
UK banks only 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
        
dumsup1_3 0.13*** 3.19 arep1_3 0.51*** 4.22 3.62* 2.86 
dumsup4_6 0.19*** 4.41 arep4_6 2.68** 3.52 6.91** 4.53 
dumsup7_9 0.32*** 5.25 arep7_9 1.32* 2.42 3.03 2.17 
dumsup10_12 0.47*** 5.86 arep10_12 2.73** 3.33 7.63* 3.05 
N 17820  11142 6678 
R2 0.43  0.53 0.52 
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Appendix I: Descriptive statistics of equity returns, standardised equity 
returns, realised volatilities and log of realised volatilities 
 
 RT_HSBC STRT_HSBC RV_HSBC LNRV_HSBC 
Mean 0.00009 0.00408 0.00640 -5.27404 
Median 0.00000 0.00000 0.00478 -5.34376 
Maximum 0.02388 4.79583 0.12424 -2.08552 
Minimum -0.02293 -2.67198 0.00030 -8.10619 
Std. Dev. 0.00417 0.69636 0.00663 0.60708 
Skewness 0.24660 0.19919 7.87243 0.72634 
Kurtosis 6.78 4.77 103.43 4.68 
Jarque-Bera 1024.6 231.9 727673.6 346.3 
Probability 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10) 10.17 8.36 181.04 1128.00 
Observations 1690 1690 1690 1690 
     
 RT_ABBN STRT_ABBN RV_ABBN LNRV_ABBN 
Mean 0.00005 0.03038 0.00942 -4.87976 
Median -0.00001 -0.00228 0.00736 -4.91173 
Maximum 0.08441 4.79583 0.09371 -2.36759 
Minimum -0.05402 -3.19664 0.00121 -6.71609 
Std. Dev. 0.00762 0.80058 0.00768 0.63178 
Skewness 0.28898 0.67459 3.82857 0.27901 
Kurtosis 15.53549 6.64651 27.88452 3.45253 
Jarque-Bera 12401.0 1190.5 53382.3 40.6 
Probability 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10) 11.86 27.33 393.77 1127.90 
Observations 1890 1890 1890 1890 
     
 RT_RBS STRT_RBS RV_RBS LNRV_RBS 
Mean 0.00002 0.00927 0.00859 -4.97074 
Median 0.00000 0.00000 0.00652 -5.03309 
Maximum 0.06851 4.14226 0.07386 -2.60559 
Minimum -0.05431 -4.79583 0.00131 -6.63635 
Std. Dev. 0.00704 0.78757 0.00714 0.61412 
Skewness 0.40899 -0.27529 3.52423 0.59460 
Kurtosis 14.04592 6.15693 22.21690 3.42949 
Jarque-Bera 9661.2 808.7 32993.9 125.9 
Probability 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10) 25.70 14.36 617.33 1103.30 
Observations 1890 1890 1890 1890 
     
 RT_BAR STRT_BAR RV_BAR LNRV_BAR 
Mean -0.00018 -0.01719 0.00848 -4.99245 
Median -0.00008 -0.01229 0.00655 -5.02860 
Maximum 0.03562 4.79583 0.07901 -2.53824 
Minimum -0.03522 -4.79583 0.00128 -6.66281 
Std. Dev. 0.00653 0.79561 0.00726 0.63030 
Skewness -0.01037 -0.24625 3.73863 0.50216 
Kurtosis 7.01948 6.52590 24.56051 3.47069 
Jarque-Bera 1252.1 982.3 40359.3 95.3 
Probability 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10) 11.33 15.60 388.40 1184.70 
Observations 1860 1860 1860 1860 
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Appendix I – Cont’d 
 RT_ABN STRT_ABN RV_ABN LNRV_ABN 
Mean -0.00015 -0.02533 0.00662 -5.18191 
Median 0.00000 0.00000 0.00533 -5.23517 
Maximum 0.03942 2.36589 0.02872 -3.55013 
Minimum -0.02908 -3.09757 0.00158 -6.45095 
Std. Dev. 0.00656 0.82940 0.00412 0.56227 
Skewness 0.01531 -0.13809 1.59031 0.28705 
Kurtosis 7.04426 3.08834 5.92887 2.51144 
Jarque-Bera 586.1 3.01267 669.9 20.36339 
Probability 0.00000 0.22172 0.00000 0.00004 
Q(10) 11.70 8.61 3220.60 3511.60 
Observations 860 860 860 860 
     
 RT_ING STRT_ING RV_ING LNRV_ING 
Mean -0.00034 -0.02326 0.00771 -5.02258 
Median -0.00049 -0.07191 0.00623 -5.07770 
Maximum 0.04948 2.58890 0.03541 -3.34064 
Minimum -0.04329 -2.53604 0.00174 -6.35512 
Std. Dev. 0.00823 0.89216 0.00474 0.54963 
Skewness -0.05213 0.06679 1.75587 0.28097 
Kurtosis 7.62067 2.60450 7.19859 2.62759 
Jarque-Bera 765.5 6.24466 1073.6 16.28465 
Probability 0.00000 0.04405 0.00000 0.00029 
Q(10) 19.22 19.52 2828.70 3354.20 
Observations 860 860 860 860 
     
 RT_BNP STRT_BNP RV_BNP LNRV_BNP 
Mean -0.00004 -0.00242 0.00659 -5.13648 
Median 0.00000 0.00000 0.00579 -5.15100 
Maximum 0.03824 2.47729 0.03044 -3.49195 
Minimum -0.03114 -2.64988 0.00179 -6.32304 
Std. Dev. 0.00647 0.85248 0.00347 0.46896 
Skewness 0.02326 0.00579 1.84142 0.31058 
Kurtosis 6.46575 2.74881 8.46773 2.80742 
Jarque-Bera 430.5 2.26574 1557.3 15.15468 
Probability 0.00000 0.32211 0.00000 0.00051 
Q(10) 11.72 6.82 1693.10 1774.00 
Observations 860 860 860 860 
     
 RT_SG STRT_SG RV_SG LNRV_SG 
Mean -0.00013 0.00721 0.00711 -5.07650 
Median 0.00003 0.00787 0.00618 -5.08696 
Maximum 0.04909 2.49453 0.02743 -3.59621 
Minimum -0.03181 -2.10022 0.00124 -6.69607 
Std. Dev. 0.00713 0.81710 0.00390 0.50335 
Skewness 0.21757 0.05793 1.53935 0.21594 
Kurtosis 8.29535 2.54741 5.98942 2.65952 
Jarque-Bera 1011.6 7.82122 659.9 10.83757 
Probability 0.00000 0.02003 0.00000 0.00443 
Q(10) 14.26 5.84 2266.00 2361.20 
Observations 860 860 860 860 
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Appendix I – Cont’d. 
 RT_DB STRT_DB RV_DB LNRV_DB 
Mean 0.00020 0.03619 0.00654 -5.13929 
Median 0.00021 0.03937 0.00576 -5.15712 
Maximum 0.05052 2.63303 0.03673 -3.30418 
Minimum -0.04452 -2.36576 0.00157 -6.45493 
Std. Dev. 0.00634 0.81330 0.00336 0.45982 
Skewness 0.20751 0.05163 1.94191 0.22775 
Kurtosis 8.31199 2.80247 9.51167 3.12052 
Jarque-Bera 3525.0 6.16832 7137.8 27.56603 
Probability 0.00000 0.04577 0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10) 12.62 9.49 6323.30 6249.60 
Observations 2980 2980 2980 2980 
     
 RT_HB STRT_HB RV_HB LNRV_HB 
Mean 0.00007 0.01273 0.00857 -4.88640 
Median 0.00017 0.02667 0.00745 -4.89958 
Maximum 0.08342 2.66851 0.05749 -2.85620 
Minimum -0.07068 -2.65283 0.00091 -6.99887 
Std. Dev. 0.00827 0.78716 0.00479 0.49526 
Skewness 0.19120 -0.02375 2.38755 0.16990 
Kurtosis 13.29451 3.04163 14.98986 3.14043 
Jarque-Bera 13177.0 0.49537 20681.0 16.78465 
Probability 0.00000 0.78061 0.00000 0.00023 
Q(10) 13.22 13.65 5729.90 6012.20 
Observations 2980 2980 2980 2980 
     
 RT_CB STRT_CB RV_CB LNRV_CB 
Mean 0.00003 -0.00511 0.00816 -4.92025 
Median -0.00008 -0.01368 0.00698 -4.96502 
Maximum 0.10784 2.79882 0.05705 -2.86389 
Minimum -0.05053 -2.68253 0.00097 -6.93674 
Std. Dev. 0.00741 0.71869 0.00436 0.45992 
Skewness 1.60941 0.10068 2.27839 0.33847 
Kurtosis 27.15508 3.37760 12.94284 3.43269 
Jarque-Bera 73733.7 22.73835 14853.4 80.14704 
Probability 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10) 25.40 15.44 8317.10 7758.80 
Observations 2980 2980 2980 2980 
 
RT stands for realised returns, STRT for standardised realised returns, RV for realised volatility, 
and LNRV for log of realised volatility. 
HSBC stands for HSBC, ABBN for Abbey National Bank, RBS for Royal Bank of Scotland, BAR 
for Barclays, ABN for ABN Amro, ING for ING Bank, BNP for BNP Paribas, SG for Société 
Générale, DB for Deutsche Bank, HB for Hypovereinsbank, and CB for Commerzbank. 
The realised returns are the sum of the two minute returns within a 46 minute window. Values are 
reported in fractions. The realised volatility is the square root of the sum of squared two minute 
returns within a 46 minute window. Standardised returns are the ratio of realised returns and their 
corresponding realised volatilities. 
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Appendix II: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regressions 
LNRV represents the log of realised volatility. HSBC stands for HSBC, ABBN for Abbey 
National Bank, RBS for Royal Bank of Scotland, BAR for Barclays, ABN for ABN Amro, ING 
for ING Bank, BNP for BNP Paribas, SG for Société Générale, DB for Deutsche Bank, HVB for 
Hypovereinsbank, and CB for Commerzbank. d99 to d04 represent year dummies. d_1 to d_9 
represent the time windows during the day and d_montue, d_wed, d_thur and d_fri are dummies 
representing the days of the week, respectively. mps is the monetary policy surprise as defined by 
the absolute value of the difference between the mean of the Reuter’s poll and the change in the 
policy rate. nomps represent days on which there was a monetary policy decision but no surprise. 
             
Variable N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
      
      
lnrv  17820 -5.04 0.55 -8.11 -1.90 
lnrv1 17820 -5.05 0.54 -8.11 -1.90 
d_cb 17820 0.15 0.36 0 1 
d_db 17820 0.15 0.36 0 1 
d_hvb 17820 0.15 0.36 0 1 
d_abn 17820 0.04 0.20 0 1 
d_ing 17820 0.04 0.20 0 1 
d_bnp 17820 0.04 0.20 0 1 
d_sg 17820 0.04 0.20 0 1 
d_hsbc 17820 0.09 0.28 0 1 
d_abbn 17820 0.10 0.29 0 1 
d_rbs 17820 0.10 0.30 0 1 
d_bar 17820 0.10 0.30 0 1 
d99 17820 0.17 0.37 0 1 
d00 17820 0.18 0.38 0 1 
d01 17820 0.18 0.38 0 1 
d02 17820 0.19 0.39 0 1 
d03 17820 0.20 0.40 0 1 
d04 17820 0.08 0.27 0 1 
d_int1 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_int2 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_int3 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_int4 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_int5 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_int6 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_int7 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_int8 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_int9 17820 0.11 0.31 0 1 
d_montue 17820 0.03 0.17 0 1 
d_wed 17820 0.33 0.47 0 1 
d_thur 17820 0.33 0.47 0 1 
d_fri 17820 0.31 0.46 0 1 
mps 17820 0.00 0.01 0 0.5 
nomps 17820 0.01 0.12 0 1 
d_per 17820 -0.35 1.28 -6.61 0 
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 Figure 1: theoretical quantile–quantile pictures 
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Figure 1 - Continued 
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Figures 2a-2k 
 
HSBC - Realized volatility averages (169 days)
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ABBN - Realized volatility averages (189 days) 
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Figures 2 – Continued 
RBS - Realized volatility averages (189 days)
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BAR - Realized volatility averages (186 days)
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Figures 2 – continued 
Deutsche Bank - Realized volatility averages (298 days)
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Hypovereinsbank - Realized volatility averages(298 days)
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Figures 2 – continued 
Commerzbank - Realized volatility averages(298 days)
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ABN Amro - Realized volatility averages(86 days)
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Figures 2 – continued 
ING Bank - Realized volatility averages (86 days)
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BNP Paribas - Realized volatility averages(86 days)
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Figures 2 – continued 
Societe Generale - Realized volatility averages (86 days)
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